Gallagher v. MaternityWise International by District of Hawaii
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 
DISTRICT OF HAWAII 
  
 
DANNY GALLAGHER, 
 
Plaintiff,  
 
 vs.  
 
MATERNITYWISE INTERNATIONAL, 
LLC, ANNE CROUDACE, ELIZBETH 
ANOATUBBY, EMILEE SALDAYA, 
RACHAEL BROWN, JENNA CHIDESTER, 
STEPHANIE GILBERT, JORDAN ASHLEY 
HOCKER, BETHANY KIRILLOVA, 
SAMANTHA LAJOIE, AERIN LUND, 
KATE PAVLOVSKY, CHANNA JAYDE 
WALZ, MADDISON WEIKLE, ESME 
WHRITENOUR, NICOLETTE RAYMOND, 
ELIZABETH GEFTAKYS, JULIE BELL, 
CARA GWIZD, HOLLY LEPPARD-
WESTHAVER, ELOISE VICTORIA,  
JANE DOE ONE,  JANE DOE TWO,  
JANE DOE THREE,  DOES 1-10, 
INCLUSIVE;   
 
Defendants. 
 
CIV. NO. 18-00364 LEK-KJM 
 
 
 
 
 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART:  
1) DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND  
AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL;  
2) DEFENDANT LUND’S JOINDER; AND 3) DEFENDANT SALDAYA’S JOINDER 
 
  On December 14, 2018, Specially Appearing Defendants 
MaternityWise International, LLC (“MaternityWise”), Christy Anne 
Croudace (“Croudace”), Jane Hopaki (“Hopaki”), Stephanie Byers 
(“Byers”), Bethany Ellen Kirillov (“Kirillov”), Kate Pavlovsky 
(“Pavlovsky”), and Madison Sisley Boulter (“Boulter” and 
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collectively “MaternityWise Defendants”),1 filed their Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for Damages and 
Demand for Jury Trial (“Motion”).  [Dkt. no. 49.]  On 
December 19, 2018, Specially Appearing Defendant Aerin Lund 
(“Lund”) filed her joinder of simple agreement to the Motion, 
and on December 28, 2018, Specially Appearing Defendant Emilee 
Saldaya (“Saldaya”) filed her joinder of simple agreement to the 
Motion (“the Joinders”).  [Dkt. nos. 52, 55.]  Plaintiff Danny 
Gallagher (“Plaintiff”) filed his memorandum in opposition on 
January 4, 2019, and the MaternityWise Defendants filed their 
reply on January 11, 2018.2  [Dkt. nos. 57, 60.]  These matters 
came on for hearing on January 25, 2019.  The MaternityWise 
Defendants’ Motion and the Joinders are hereby granted in part 
and denied in part as this Court does not have personal 
jurisdiction over the parties other than MaternityWise, 
Croudace, and Boulter.  The dismissal is without prejudice and 
Plaintiff has leave to amend.  
                     
1 Plaintiff identifies Hopaki as “Elizbeth Anoatubby,” 
[Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 6,] Byers as “Stephanie Gilbert,” 
[id. at ¶ 10,] and Boulter as “Maddison Weikle,” [id. at ¶ 17].   
 
2 The MaternityWise Defendants later submitted a Notice of 
Errata to Specially Appearing Defendants’ Reply in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, filed on 
January 14, 2019.  [Dkt. no. 61.]  
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  The instant action involves various claims, including 
those for defamation, as a result of comments about Plaintiff 
which were made on social media; specifically Facebook.  Due to 
the global reach of this popular social networking website, 
individuals sued in this matter apparently reside in various 
places throughout the United States as well as other countries.  
At the heart of the Motion is this issue: where the acts alleged 
as the basis for the cause of actions occurred in cyberspace, 
can personal jurisdiction ever exist?  
BACKGROUND 
  Plaintiff filed his original complaint on 
September 25, 2018 based on diversity jurisdiction.  [Dkt. 
no. 1.]  The operative pleading relevant to the issues at hand 
is Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for Damages and Demand 
for Jury Trial (“Second Amended Complaint”) filed on October 4, 
2018, in which the defendants are the MaternityWise Defendants, 
Saldaya, Lund, Rachel Brown (“Brown”), Jenna Chidester 
(“Chidester”), Jordan Ashley Hocker (“Hocker”), Samantha Lajoie 
(“Lajoie”), Channa Jayde Walz (“Walz”), Esme Whritenour 
(“Whritenour”), Nicolette Raymond (“Raymond”), Elizabeth 
Geftakys (“Geftakys”), Julie Bell (“Bell”), Cara Gwizd 
(“Gwizd”), Holly Leppard-Westhaver (“Leppard-Westhaver”), Eloise 
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Victoria (“Victoria” and collectively “Defendants”).3  [Dkt. 
no. 33.]   
  According to the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff 
is a resident of the State of Hawai`i, and MaternityWise is a 
limited liability company that “acquir[ed] its charter under the 
laws” of New York, with its principal place of business in 
Texas.  [Id. at ¶¶ 3-4.]  Croudace is a citizen of Texas, and is 
the principal of MaternityWise.  [Id. at ¶¶ 5, 36.]  Plaintiff 
alleges all other named defendants are not citizens of the State 
of Hawai`i, and some are not citizens of the United States.  
[Id. at pgs. 3-5.]  The gravamen of Plaintiff’s claims is that 
Defendants have all made defamatory statements about Plaintiff 
via social media, which have gone “viral.”  [Id.]  As a result, 
he has been irreparably harmed.  [Id. at ¶ 33.] 
 The allegations pertinent to the Motion at hand are that: 
MaternityWise provides a doula training and certification 
program in exchange for a fee; Croudace is certified through 
MaternityWise to train prospective doulas; Croudace and 
MaternityWise use Facebook and various social media discussion 
                     
3 Plaintiff also identifies Brown as “Rachael Phoenix” and 
Geftakys as “Becca Russell.”  [Second Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 8, 
20.]  Plaintiff later dismissed all of his claims without 
prejudice against Hocker on November 30, 2018, and on 
December 13, 2018, Plaintiff dismissed all of his claims without 
prejudice against Geftakys.  [Dkt. nos. 40, 48.]  
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groups to market the MaternityWise program to every state and 
country - including the State of Hawai`i - to find both clients 
and students; some of the doula training workshops are marketed 
towards, and held in Hawai`i; and Plaintiff obtained his doula 
certification through a MaternityWise training workshop held in 
Hawai`i.  [Id. at ¶¶ 34, 39, 40-42.]   
  As to the alleged defamation, Plaintiff’s claims 
center on two sources of defamation – first, a “Memorandum of 
Official Statement” dated June 5, 2018 (“MaternityWise 
Memorandum”) sent by Croudace, in which Plaintiff was accused of 
violating the ethical and professional standards of his 
profession as a photographer and doula; and, second, comments 
posted on Plaintiff’s Facebook page, in which he is accused of 
rape, attempted murder, sexual exploitation, prostitution, 
“pimping,” and/or sexual harassment.  [Id. at ¶ 120.]  
 In the Motion, the MaternityWise Defendants seek 
dismissal of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to properly 
serve the Second Amended Complaint upon the MaternityWise 
Defendants but do not specify whether dismissal should be made 
with or without prejudice.   
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DISCUSSION 
I. Personal Jurisdiction 
  In considering a motion brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, this Court has 
stated:  
 A plaintiff has the burden of establishing 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant.  See Love v. Associated Newspapers, 
Ltd., 611 F.3d 601, 608 (9th Cir. 2010); 
Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 
797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004).  A plaintiff must 
establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant 
with respect to each claim.  Action Embroidery 
Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 
1180 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Personal jurisdiction must 
exist for each claim asserted against a 
defendant.” (citing Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. 
Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1289 n.8 (9th Cir. 
1977))). 
 
 When, as here, a district court acts on a 
motion to dismiss without holding an evidentiary 
hearing, a plaintiff need only make a prima facie 
showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the 
motion to dismiss.  Love, 611 F.3d at 608; 
Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800.  Although a 
plaintiff may not simply rest on the bare 
allegations of the complaint, uncontroverted 
allegations in the complaint must be taken as 
true, and conflicts between parties over 
statements contained in affidavits or 
declarations must be resolved in the plaintiff’s 
favor.  See Love, 611 F.3d at 608; 
Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800. 
 
Barranco v. 3D Sys. Corp., 6 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1076 (D. Hawai`i 
2014) (some citations omitted).  
 The district court considers two factors 
before exercising personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant in a diversity of 
Case 1:18-cv-00364-LEK-KJM   Document 64   Filed 02/27/19   Page 6 of 31     PageID #: 651
7 
 
citizenship case: “(1) whether an applicable 
state rule or statute potentially confers 
jurisdiction over the defendant; and (2) whether 
assertion of such jurisdiction accords with 
constitutional principles of due process.”  Flynt 
Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1392 (9th 
Cir. 1984).  “The jurisdictional inquiries under 
state law and federal due process merge into one 
analysis” when, as here, the state’s long-arm 
statute is “coextensive with federal due process 
requirements.”  Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 
617, 620 (9th Cir. 1991).  See Cowan v. First 
Ins. Co. of Hawaii, 61 Haw. 644, 649, 608 P.2d 
394, 399 (1980) (Hawaii’s long-arm statute, Haw. 
Rev. Stat. § 634-35, was adopted to expand the 
jurisdiction of Hawaii’s courts to the extent 
permitted by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). . . . 
 
 The Due Process Clause protects a person’s 
“liberty interest in not being subject to the 
binding judgments of a forum with which he has 
established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or 
relations.’”  Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 
U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. 
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).  The 
Due Process Clause requires that defendants have 
“certain minimum contacts with [Hawaii] such that 
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.”  Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; Data 
Disc, Inc. v. Systems Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 
F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977).  The minimum 
contacts required mean that the defendant must 
have purposefully availed itself of the privilege 
of conducting activities within the foreign 
jurisdiction, thereby invoking the benefits and 
protections of the foreign jurisdiction’s laws.  
See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Sup. Court of Cal., 
480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987).  In applying Due 
Process Clause requirements, courts have created 
two jurisdictional concepts—general and specific 
jurisdiction. 
 
 A court may exercise general jurisdiction 
over the defendant when the defendant is a 
resident or domiciliary of the forum state, or 
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the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are 
continuous, systematic, and substantial.  
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. 
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16 [104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 
L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984)]; Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 
1287. . . . 
  
 . . . . 
  
 Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, 
may be found when the cause of action arises out 
of the defendant’s contact or activities in the 
forum state.  See Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 
F.2d 617, 620 (9th Cir. 1991); Data Disc, 557 
F.2d at 1287. . . . 
 
Id. at 1077-78 (some alterations in Barranco) (some citations 
omitted).  Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the Court 
has personal jurisdiction over each of the defendants.  See Rush 
v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980) (“The requirements of 
International Shoe, however, must be met as to each defendant 
over whom a state court exercises jurisdiction.”).   
 A. General Jurisdiction 
  “For an individual, the paradigm forum for the 
exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; 
for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the 
corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”  Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011) 
(citation omitted).  Plaintiff argues this Court has general 
jurisdiction over MaternityWise and Croudace because they 
conduct business, advertise, and hold trainings in Hawai`i, and 
are thus essentially present in the forum.  [Mem. in Opp. at 7; 
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Second Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 39-44.]  The MaternityWise 
Defendants argue MaternityWise’s certification trainings occur 
in Hawai`i approximately once a year, and the last training held 
in Hawai`i was conducted from April 25 to April 28, 2018.  
[Reply, Decl. Kevin A. Yolken (“Yolken Decl.”), at ¶ 6.4]   
  Although MaternityWise conducts some of its trainings 
in the forum and advertises its workshops in Hawai`i, Plaintiff 
has not shown that general jurisdiction exists.  First, 
Plaintiff alleges MaternityWise advertises its business to 
“residents of every state and country,” in addition to Hawai`i.  
[Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 39.]  Second, Plaintiff’s Exhibit 
15 demonstrates that MaternityWise offers doula training not 
only in Hawai`i, but also Illinois, Florida, California, 
Minnesota, Maryland, South Carolina, Atlanta, Texas, and New 
York, [Decl. of Danny Gallagher in supp. of mem. in opp. 
(“Gallagher Decl.”), filed 1/4/19 (dkt. no. 58), Exh. 15 
(screenshot of www.maternitywise.com),] and appears to permit 
website users to “request more doula trainings” for the rest of 
the United States, including Washington D.C. and the Virgin 
Islands.  [Gallagher Decl., Exh. 18 (screenshot of 
www.maternitywise.com/doulatrainingdates).]  It can hardly be 
                     
4 Kevin A. Yolken is one of the attorneys retained to 
specially represent the MaternityWise Defendants in this matter.  
[Yolken Decl. at ¶ 2.] 
         (. . . continued) 
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said that MaternityWise is “at home” in Hawai`i, when it 
conducts business and advertises its workshops across the United 
States.5  See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 n.20 (2014) 
(“General jurisdiction [] calls for an appraisal of a 
corporation’s activities in their entirety, nationwide and 
worldwide.  A corporation that operates in many places can 
scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.”); see also Goodyear, 
564 U.S. at 919 (“A court may assert general jurisdiction over 
foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear 
any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the 
State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them 
essentially at home in the forum State.” (quoting International 
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317)).  Accordingly, the Court finds that it 
does not have general jurisdiction over MaternityWise.   
  With regard to Croudace, the primary focus is her 
domicile.  See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137.  Plaintiff alleges 
Croudace is domiciled in, and is a citizen of Texas, see Second 
Amended Complaint at ¶ 5, while the MaternityWise Defendants 
assert Croudace resides in New York.  See Reply at 5; Yolken 
Decl. at ¶ 3.  In any case, neither assertion indicates that 
                     
5 Exhibit 18 offers a link titled “Outside of the USA, Click 
Here” on its Labor Doula Training Workshops & Postpartum Doula 
Training and Certification page, suggesting MaternityWise also 
advertises to consumers beyond the United States.  [Gallagher 
Decl., Exh. 18 at pg. 7 (emphasis in original).]   
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Croudace is domiciled in Hawai`i, therefore the Court finds 
general jurisdiction over Croudace is not appropriate in 
Hawai`i. 
 B. Specific Jurisdiction 
  In the alternative, Plaintiff argues this Court has 
specific jurisdiction over all Defendants.  The Ninth Circuit 
applies the following three-part test to determine whether 
personal jurisdiction exists:  
(1) The non-resident defendant must 
purposefully direct his activities or 
consummate some transaction with the forum 
or resident thereof; or perform some act by 
which he purposefully avails himself of the 
privilege of conducting activities in the 
forum, thereby invoking the benefits and 
protections of its laws; 
 
(2) the claim must be one which arises out 
of or relates to the defendant’s forum-
related activities; and 
 
(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must 
comport with fair play and substantial 
justice, i.e. it must be reasonable. 
 
Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 
1987).  The plaintiff bears the burden of 
satisfying the first two prongs of the test.  
Sher [v. Johnson], 911 F.2d [1357,] 1361 [(9th 
Cir. 1990)].  If the plaintiff fails to satisfy 
either of these prongs, personal jurisdiction is 
not established in the forum state.  If the 
plaintiff succeeds in satisfying both of the 
first two prongs, the burden then shifts to the 
defendant to “present a compelling case” that the 
exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.  
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 
476–78, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 
(1985). . . .  
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Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802.  With regard to the first prong 
of the specific jurisdiction test, the Ninth Circuit generally 
looks to a party’s “purposeful direction” for actions sounding 
in tort, and “purposeful availment” for actions sounding in 
contract.  See id. at 802-03.  In evaluating purposeful 
direction, the Ninth Circuit uses a three-part “effects” test 
derived from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).6  See Dole Food Co. v. 
Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002).  “[T]he Calder 
‘effects’ test requires that the defendant allegedly have 
(1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the 
forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely 
to be suffered in the forum state.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
  1. Purposeful Direction 
   a. MaternityWise and Croudace 
  Although Plaintiff’s allegations that MaternityWise 
and Croudace conduct business in Hawai`i failed to establish 
general jurisdiction, the Court finds the same factual 
allegations are enough to establish specific personal 
jurisdiction.  See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et 
                     
6 In Calder, the Supreme Court held that the California 
court could exercise jurisdiction over two Florida newspapermen 
who “expressly aimed” their conduct in Florida to allegedly 
cause injuries to a resident in California.  465 U.S. at 783, 
789.   
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L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[The 
first prong] may be satisfied by purposeful availment of the 
privilege of doing business in the forum; by purposeful 
direction of activities at the forum; or by some combination 
thereof.”).  Because Plaintiff alleges MaternityWise and 
Croudace marketed and held doula trainings and workshops in 
Hawai`i, and Plaintiff was certified through one of their 
Hawai`i training workshops, Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts 
to show MaternityWise and Croudace purposefully directed their 
activities at the forum, to meet the first prong of the specific 
jurisdiction test.   
   b. Hopaki, Byers, Kirillov, and Pavlovksy 
 
  As to Hopaki, Byers, Kirillov, and Pavlovksy, the 
Court has carefully examined Plaintiff’s allegations and the 
evidence as to each defendant to determine whether any grounds 
for specific personal jurisdiction may exist.  None of the 
parties dispute that the acts alleged in the Second Amended 
Complaint were intentional.  The dispositive issue here is 
whether the defendants “expressly aimed” their injurious conduct 
at Plaintiff, such that they knew harm would be suffered in 
Hawai`i.  See id.  Plaintiff argues all Defendants directed 
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their defamatory statements toward his Facebook business pages,7 
which promoted his doula and photography work in Hawai`i, 
thereby purposefully directing their conduct at the forum.  
Plaintiff also submitted screenshots of the comments on his 
Danny the Doula business page, and his Maternity in Motion 
business page to show that his primary business location and his 
residence in Hawai`i were readily apparent.  See Gallagher Decl. 
at ¶¶ 7-10, Exh. 1 (screenshot of Danny the Doula Facebook 
business page “Reviews” tab, Exh. 2 (screenshot of Maternity in 
Motion Facebook business page).  Plaintiff asserts his Danny the 
Doula page was linked to his Maternity in Motion page, and the 
Maternity in Motion page clearly displayed photography and 
videography taken in Hawai`i.  [Id. at ¶¶ 8, 10.]  Plaintiff 
states both pages are meant to have the “feel of Hawaii,” based 
on the Hawaiian imagery and language used in his posts.  [Id. at 
¶ 10.]  Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that, on June 3, 2018, a 
Facebook user named Chrystal Docker – who is not a part of this 
action - posted a comment on the Danny the Doula Reviews tab, 
then posted a subsequent reply to her initial comment, that 
Plaintiff is from Hawai`i.  [Id. at ¶ 8, Exh. 1 at 2.]   
                     
7 Plaintiff maintains two Facebook business pages, titled 
“Danny the Doula” and “Maternity in Motion,” to promote his 
professional work as a doula and photographer/videographer.  
[Gallagher Decl. at ¶ 5.]   
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  However, Plaintiff’s Maternity in Motion business page 
does not expressly state Plaintiff’s primary place of business 
is Hawai`i and instead shows Plaintiff’s described professional 
goal is to “travel the world, telling the stories of our world’s 
birthers and their journeys as creators of life.”  [Reply at 10-
11 (citing Gallagher Decl., Exh. 8 (screenshot of Maternity in 
Motion “About” section)).]  While it is possible that 
Plaintiff’s photographs containing waterfalls and other 
landscape, could be recognized by some as being taken in 
Hawai`i, it is apparent that these photographs are not 
explicitly identified as having been taken there.   
  When combined with the lack of Hawai`i being expressly 
mentioned on Plaintiff’s business page, the reasonable inference 
is that nothing on Plaintiff’s business pages or his photography 
work displayed of Facebook identifies Plaintiff as living or 
working in Hawai`i.  Plaintiff is unable to meet his burden of 
proof in demonstrating that Hopaki, Byers, Kirillov, and 
Pavlovksy knew Plaintiff lived and operated his businesses in 
Hawai`i, and directed their comments at the forum.  There is no 
express statement that Plaintiff’s businesses are located in 
Hawai`i on either of Plaintiff’s business pages, and Plaintiff’s 
counsel was unable to identify any at the hearing.  Plaintiff’s 
photographs, though labeled with “#Oahu,” “#Maui,” and “#Japan,” 
in the information above some of the images, see Gallagher 
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Decl., Exh. 2, appear to be posted only on Plaintiff’s Maternity 
in Motion business page, not the Danny the Doula business page 
where the allegedly defamatory comments appear to be directed; 
and Plaintiff has not demonstrated either Hopaki, Byers, 
Kirillov, or Pavlovksy accessed both business pages.  Further, 
Plaintiff’s argument that Ms. Docker stated Plaintiff is “in 
Hawaii” is unavailing.  Plaintiff explained the “Reviews tab 
showed as many comments and replies as the site allowed to open 
at one time in order to take an accurate view of all information 
on the tab(s).”  [Gallagher Decl. at ¶ 6 (emphasis added).]  
However, Plaintiff neither argued nor submitted other evidence 
that Hopaki, Byers, Kirillov, or Pavlovksy “opened” Ms. Docker’s 
comment or reply in order to view it.  Nor does the Second 
Amended Complaint plead any additional non-conclusory facts that 
Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiff was based in 
Hawai`i.  For example, Plaintiff simply alleges “[a]ll 
defendants . . . [were] fully aware that plaintiff lived in 
Hawaii and that plaintiff was a professionally practicing doula 
and photographer in the state of Hawaii.”  [Second Amended 
Complaint at ¶ 141.]  Plaintiff fails to explain, however, how 
and why Defendants should have known he was in Hawai`i - such as 
an express statement on a Facebook page or prior interaction 
with Plaintiff – in order to plausibly allege that Defendants 
knew Plaintiff lived and worked in Hawai`i.  See Ashcroft v. 
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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Where a complaint pleads facts 
that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it 
stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 
entitlement to relief”. (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)).   
Plaintiff has not met the first prong of the specific 
jurisdiction test as to these defendants and, therefore, the 
Court need not address the second or third prongs of the 
specific jurisdiction test.  It concludes that it does not have 
personal jurisdiction over Hopaki, Byers, Kirillov, and 
Pavlovsky.  See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802 (“If the 
plaintiff fails to satisfy either [the first or second] prongs, 
personal jurisdiction is not established in the forum state.”).  
Accordingly, the Motion is granted insofar as Plaintiff’s claims 
are dismissed as to Hopaki, Byers, Kirillov, and Pavlovksy.   
   c. Boulter 
  Boulter presents the only exception to the analysis 
above.  Boulter commented on Plaintiff’s Danny the Doula 
business page and received a direct reply from Ms. Docker that 
Plaintiff was “in Hawaii.”  [Gallagher Decl., Exh. 1 at 1.]  
Boulter also commented on the Reviews tabs on Plaintiff’s Danny 
the Doula and Maternity in Motion business pages.  [Id., Exh. 2 
at 2.]  Because Boulter was told where Plaintiff resides, and 
viewed both the Danny the Doula and Maternity in Motion business 
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pages that had photographs of Plaintiff’s business in Hawai`i, 
it is reasonable to infer that Boulter knew Plaintiff lived and 
worked in Hawai`i, and directed her comments at Plaintiff’s 
business pages with the intent of injuring his business in the 
forum.  Such was the case in Jason Scott Collection Inc. v. 
Trendily Furniture LLC, No. CV. 17-02712-PHX-JJT, 2017 WL 
6888514, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 25, 2017).  There, the plaintiff 
brought suit in the United States District Court for the 
District of Arizona, alleging copyright infringement.  The 
Arizona district court found that the nonresident defendant sold 
allegedly infringing pieces of furniture in the same market as 
Plaintiff, thereby “taking aim at Plaintiff’s copyrights and 
undermining Plaintiff’s business,” and ruled that it had 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.  Id. at *3.  Trendily 
distinguished its ruling from Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 
(2014), and Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2015), 
noting both cases involved interference with personal finances, 
which affected the plaintiffs personally, regardless of their 
state of residence.  Id.  The MaternityWise Defendants also cite 
to Walden and Picot in support of their position.  However, the 
Court finds the analysis in Trendily persuasive and applicable 
to the situation at hand because Boulter knew Plaintiff resided 
and worked in Hawai`i, and directed her allegedly defamatory 
comments at the forum to undermine his Hawai`i business.  Thus, 
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the first prong of the specific jurisdiction test is met, as to 
Boulter.  
   d. Lund, Saldaya, Brown, Chidester,  
    Walz, Whritenour, Raymond, Bell, 
    Gwizd, Leppard-Westhaver, and Victoria 
 
  Because Lund and Saldaya only filed joinders of simple 
agreement,8 and neither Brown, Chidester, Walz, Whritenour, 
Raymond, Bell, Gwizd, Leppard-Westhaver, nor Victoria have filed 
any joinder in the Motion, the Court is not required to address 
personal jurisdiction as to these defendants.  See Pakootas v. 
Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(“Because a party can waive personal jurisdiction, [a court is] 
not required to consider it sua sponte.”).  However, in the 
interest of judicial economy, the Court finds that the foregoing 
purposeful direction analysis applies equally to Lund, Saldaya, 
Brown, Chidester, Walz, Whritenour, Raymond, Bell, Gwizd, 
Leppard-Westhaver, and Victoria because Plaintiff has neither 
pled facts in the Second Amended Complaint nor presented 
evidence in connection with the Motion to establish that these 
                     
8 This Court has previously explained that the Local Rules 
distinguish between substantive joinders and joinders of simple 
agreement, particularly with regard to the relief obtained by 
the joining party.  See Hyland v. Office of Hous. & Cmty. Dev., 
CIVIL 15-00504 LEK-RLP, 2018 WL 4119903, at *3 (D. Hawai`i 
Aug. 29, 2018) (“A party filing a substantive joinder may 
‘seek[] the same relief sought by the movant for himself, 
herself, or itself,’ whereas a joinder of simple agreement 
‘simply seek[s] relief for the original movant.’” (alterations 
in Hyland) (quoting Local Rule LR7.9)).   
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defendants were aware Plaintiff lived and worked in Hawai`i.  
Thus, Plaintiff has not established the first prong of the 
specific jurisdiction test as to those defendants.  There is, 
therefore, no personal jurisdiction over Lund, Saldaya, Brown, 
Chidester, Walz, Whritenour, Raymond, Bell, Gwizd, Leppard-
Westhaver, and Victoria, and Plaintiff’s claims against those 
defendants are dismissed as well.  
  2. Defendant’s Forum Related Activities 
 
  Because Plaintiff alleges his injuries arise out of 
MaternityWise’s and Croudace’s business in Hawai`i, i.e., the 
doula certification program, the second prong of the specific 
jurisdiction test is also met.  As to Boulter, Plaintiff’s 
alleged injuries necessarily arise from Boulter’s intentional 
interaction with the forum, i.e., posting comments on 
Plaintiff’s Facebook business pages that Boulter knew or should 
have known were based in Hawai`i.  Thus, the second prong of the 
specific jurisdiction test is met as to Boulter as well. 
  3. Reasonableness of Exercise of Jurisdiction 
  Because Plaintiff has established the first two prongs 
of the specific jurisdiction test as to MaternityWise, Croudace, 
and Boulter (“Remaining Defendants”), the burden shifts to them 
to show that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be 
reasonable.  See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802.  This Court 
previously stated:  
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In determining whether exercise of jurisdiction 
is reasonable so as to comport with fair play and 
substantial justice, courts must consider the 
following factors: 
 
(1) the extent of the defendants’ 
purposeful interjection into the forum 
state’s affairs; 
 
(2) the burden on the defendant of 
defending in the forum; 
 
(3) the extent of conflict with the 
sovereignty of the defendants’ state; 
 
(4) the forum state’s interest in 
adjudicating the dispute; 
 
(5) the most efficient judicial 
resolution of the controversy; 
 
(6) the importance of the forum to the 
plaintiff’s interest in convenient and 
effective relief; and 
 
(7) the existence of an alternative 
forum. 
 
Fiore [v. Walden], 688 F.3d [558, 583–84 
(9th Cir. 2011)].  The Court balances all 
seven factors, recognizing that none of the 
factors is dispositive in itself.  Id.  
 
[Trade W., Inc. v. Dollar Tree, Inc., Civ. 
No. 12–00606 ACK–BMK, 2013 WL 1856302, at *7 (D. 
Hawaii Apr. 30, 2013)].   
 
Barranco, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 1082 (alterations in Barranco).  
Here, the Remaining Defendants argue generally that the exercise 
of jurisdiction would be unreasonable because they have not 
purposefully or expressly targeted Hawai`i, and the burden of 
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defending this action in the forum would be extremely great.  
[Mem. in Supp. of Motion at 13.]  
   a. Purposeful Interjection  
  This Court previously stated:  
 “The Ninth Circuit has recognized that 
‘circumstances may exist where the level of 
purposeful injection into the forum supports a 
finding of purposeful availment yet still weighs 
against the reasonableness of jurisdiction.’”  
[Trade West, 2013 WL 1856302, at *7] (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fiore, 688 F.3d 
at 583).  “‘The smaller the element of purposeful 
interjection, the less is jurisdiction to be 
anticipated and the less reasonable its 
exercise.’”  Id. (quoting Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. 
Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1271 (9th Cir. 
1981)). 
 
Barranco, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 1082.  MaternityWise and Croudace 
have purposefully interjected themselves into the forum by 
advertising and doing business in Hawai`i, therefore, this 
factor weighs in favor of Plaintiff.  As to Boulter, because her 
interjection arose merely from her comments on Plaintiff’s 
Facebook pages, the Court finds the level of Boulter’s 
purposeful interjection into Hawai`i is slight, and this factor 
weighs in favor of Boulter.   
   b. Burden on the Defendant 
  The Remaining Defendants argue the burden of defending 
in the forum is great where all of the Defendants are located 
thousands of miles from Hawai`i.  The Ninth Circuit has 
cautioned that, “unless the inconvenience is so great as to 
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constitute a deprivation of due process, it will not overcome 
clear justifications for the exercise of jurisdiction.”  
Panavision Int’l, LP v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1323 (9th Cir. 
1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
Further, this district court has recognized that advancements in 
communication and transportation have reduced the overall 
inconvenience of defending in another forum.  See Kukui Gardens 
Corp. v. Holco Capital Grp., Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1116 
(D. Hawai`i 2008) (citations omitted).  This factor therefore 
weighs in favor of Plaintiff.  
   c. Conflict with State Sovereignty 
  The Remaining Defendants have not addressed whether 
proceeding in the forum would conflict with the sovereignty of 
any of the states in which they reside.  Plaintiff asserts no 
conflict exists because it is “Plaintiff’s reputation and 
business in Hawaii that was destroyed and must be protected.”  
[Mem. in Opp. at 20.]  Even if the Remaining Defendants had 
presented any argument, the “sovereignty of a defendant’s state 
is not a significant consideration in actions between citizens 
of the United States.”  Kukui Gardens, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 1116 
(citing Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 
834, 841 (9th Cir. 1986)).  Accordingly, this factor weighs in 
favor of Plaintiff.  
 
Case 1:18-cv-00364-LEK-KJM   Document 64   Filed 02/27/19   Page 23 of 31     PageID #:
 668
24 
 
   d. Interest of Hawai`i   
“Hawaii has a strong interest in providing an 
effective means of redress for its residents who 
are tortiously injured.”  Resnick [v. Rowe], 283 
F. Supp. 2d [1128,] 1141 [(D. Hawai`i 2003)] 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
“A state generally has a ‘manifest interest’ in 
providing its residents with a convenient forum 
for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state 
actors.”  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473, 105 S. 
Ct. 2174. 
 
Barranco, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 1083.  Since Plaintiff is a resident 
of Hawai`i, this factor weighs in his favor. 
   e. Efficiency 
  This factor “‘focuses on the location of the evidence 
and witnesses[,]’ and is ‘no longer weighed heavily given the 
modern advances in communication and transportation.’”  Id. 
(other citation omitted) (citing Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1323).  
Based on Plaintiff’s allegations, the evidence of the harm 
suffered by him is in Hawai`i, and all other evidence is 
accessible online.  However, since neither of the Remaining 
Defendants reside in Hawai`i and any travel will be costly, 
there will be some additional expense in bringing in witnesses.  
On balance, the Court finds this factor is neutral.  
   f. Convenient and Effective  
    Relief for Plaintiff  
 
  Hawai`i is the more convenient forum for Plaintiff 
because he currently lives in Hawai`i.  Plaintiff asserts his 
business is primarily in Hawai`i, and litigating in alternative 
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forums, as the Remaining Defendants suggest, would be unduly 
burdensome because it would result in “twenty or so” separate 
proceedings and would offend judicial economy and efficiency.  
[Mem. in Opp. at 21.]  However, in evaluating this factor, 
“little weight is given to the plaintiff’s inconvenience.”  
Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1324 (citation omitted).  Additionally, 
the acts of each defendant in this case were discreet, could be 
judged individually, and therefore need not be tried together.  
See Terracom v. Valley Nat.l Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 562 (9th Cir. 
1995).  Because Plaintiff’s inconvenience is given little 
weight, this factor weighs in favor of the Remaining Defendants.  
   g. Existence of an Alternative Forum  
  Here, Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating no 
alternative forum is available.  See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 
1324.  The parties agree that alternative forums exist, although 
Plaintiff argues filing in the forum of each defendant would be 
unduly burdensome and against judicial economy.  Still, because 
Plaintiff has not met his burden in demonstrating Hawai`i is the 
only forum available, this factor weighs in favor of the 
Remaining Defendants.   
   h. Summary of the Seven Factors 
  The second, third, and fourth factors weigh in favor 
of jurisdiction in the forum, and the first factor partially 
weighs in Plaintiff’s favor insofar as it pertains to 
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MaternityWise and Croudace.  The sixth and seventh factors weigh 
in favor of the Remaining Defendants, and the first factor as to 
Boulter weighs only slightly against jurisdiction.  The fifth 
factor is neutral.  The factors are nearly evenly split, if not 
slightly more in favor of Plaintiff.  However, because the 
Remaining Defendants must present a “compelling case” against 
reasonableness, the third prong of the specific jurisdiction 
test is met.  See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).   
  In sum, all three prongs of the specific jurisdiction 
test have been met, and it is appropriate to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over MaternityWise, Croudace, and Boulter.   
 C. Leave to Amend 
  Insofar as this Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s claims 
against Hopaki, Byers, Kirillov, Pavlovksy, Lund, Saldaya, 
Brown, Chidester, Walz, Whritenour, Raymond, Bell, Gwizd, 
Leppard-Westhaver, and Victoria, the dismissal is without 
prejudice because it is possible that Plaintiff could amend his 
complaint to cure the deficiencies identified herein.  See 
Sonoma Cty. Ass’n of Retired Emps. v. Sonoma Cty., 708 F.3d 
1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2013) (“As a general rule, dismissal 
without leave to amend is improper unless it is clear, upon de 
novo review, that the complaint could not be saved by any 
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amendment.” (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
II. Venue 
  The Remaining Defendants assert venue is improper here 
because the Second Amended Complaint does not allege any of the 
events occurred in the forum, and all of the evidence and 
witnesses are not in Hawai`i.  Venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1391, which states in pertinent part:  
(b) Venue in general. - A civil action may be 
brought in -  
 
(1) a judicial district in which any 
defendant resides, if all defendants are 
residents of the State in which the district 
is located; 
 
(2) a judicial district in which a 
substantial part of the events or omissions 
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a 
substantial part of property that is the 
subject of the action is situated; or 
 
(3) if there is no district in which an 
action may otherwise be brought as provided 
in this section, any judicial district in 
which any defendant is subject to the 
court’s personal jurisdiction with respect 
to such action. 
 
  Here, section (b)(1) does not apply because all of the 
Remaining Defendants are not residents of a single state.  
However, section (b)(2) is applicable because the claims against 
the Remaining Defendants, appear to arise primarily out of 
Plaintiff’s doula certification through MaternityWise, which 
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took place in Hawai`i, and Plaintiff alleges he suffered harm in 
Hawai`i.  See Miracle v. N.Y.P. Holdings, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 
1060, 1072-73 (D. Hawai`i 2000) (ruling that venue in Hawai`i 
for a defamation action against nonresident defendants was 
proper where “the harm [plaintiff] experienced as a result of 
the article occurred in Hawaii”).  Therefore, venue is 
appropriate in Hawai`i.  
  Nonetheless, the Remaining Defendants assert this 
Court has the discretion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended 
Complaint based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens.  The 
Ninth Circuit has stated the doctrine of forum non conveniens is 
“an exceptional tool to be employed sparingly, [not a] . . . 
doctrine that compels plaintiffs to choose the optimal forum for 
their claim.”  Dole, 303 F.3d at 1118 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted) (alterations in Dole).  The moving 
party bears the burden of demonstrating that: (1) an adequate 
alternative forum exists; and (2) the balance of private and 
public interest factors weigh in favor of dismissal.  Lueck v. 
Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2001).   
  In the instant matter, the Remaining Defendants 
suggest Plaintiff should file “separate actions where 
jurisdiction is appropriate, and if warranted, mov[e] to 
consolidate those actions through the mechanisms and procedures 
available.”  [Reply at 6.]  The Remaining Defendants largely 
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rely on their position that personal jurisdiction does not 
exist, and have not presented any other persuasive arguments 
detailing how either the private or public factors should be 
considered.  Because the Remaining Defendants have only 
addressed the first prong of the forum non conveniens analysis, 
they have failed to meet their burden in persuading this Court 
that dismissal based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens is 
warranted under these circumstances.  The Court therefore denies 
the Motion as to the MaternityWise Defendants’ arguments 
regarding venue.   
III. Improper Service  
  Finally, the Remaining Defendants argue Plaintiff has 
failed to properly serve the Second Amended Complaint, which is 
the operative complaint in this case.  Because the Court has 
dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Hocker, Byers, Kirillov, 
and Pavlovsky, the Motion is DENIED AS MOOT as to those 
defendants.9  However, since the Court has determined personal 
jurisdiction exists as to MaternityWise, Croudace, and Boulter, 
the Court reserves ruling on this issue and DIRECTS the parties 
to meet and confer regarding accepting service of the operative 
                     
9 The Court declines to address this issue as to Lund, 
Saldaya, Brown, Chidester, Walz, Whritenour, Raymond, Bell, 
Gwizd, Leppard-Westhaver, and Victoria since the Court has ruled 
that it does not have personal jurisdiction over these 
defendants.  
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complaint.  If Plaintiff files a third amended complaint and 
service of process issues arise, the Court DIRECTS the parties 
to meet and confer before submitting the issues to the 
magistrate judge.   
CONCLUSION 
  On the basis of the foregoing, the MaternityWise 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended 
Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial, filed 
December 14, 2018, is HEREBY GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.  
The Motion is GRANTED insofar as the Court concludes it does not 
have personal jurisdiction over Hopaki, Byers, Kirillov, and 
Pavlovsky, and all claims against those defendants are DISMISSED 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE; the remainder of the Motion as to those 
defendants is DENIED AS MOOT.  The Motion is DENIED as to 
MaternityWise, Croudace, and Boulter with regard to personal 
jurisdiction and venue, and the Court RESERVES RULING on the 
portion of the Motion concerning service.  The Joinders are also 
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART because the Joinders merely 
support the relief sought by the MaternityWise Defendants.  
However, all of Plaintiff’s claims against Lund, Saldaya, Brown, 
Chidester, Walz, Whritenour, Raymond, Bell, Gwizd, Leppard-
Westhaver, and Victoria are HEREBY DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, 
based on the Court’s conclusion that it does not have personal 
jurisdiction over these defendants.  
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To the extent that Plaintiff’s claims have been 
dismissed without prejudice, this Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave 
to file a third amended complaint consistent with the terms of 
this Order.  Plaintiff must file his third amended complaint by 
no later than April 29, 2019.  This Court CAUTIONS Plaintiff 
that, if he fails to file his third amended complaint by 
April 29, 2019, the claims which this Order dismissed without 
prejudice may be dismissed with prejudice.  Further, if 
Plaintiff’s third amended complaint fails to cure the defects 
identified in this Order, this Court may dismiss those claims 
with prejudice.  If Plaintiff’s third amended complaint attempts 
to add new parties, claims, or theories of liability, this Court 
may dismiss those claims, but without prejudice. 
  IT IS SO ORDERED. 
  DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAI`I, February 27, 2019. 
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